Introduction
The Air Force has become careless in its thinking about airpower. For the past three decades – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria – the United States was primarily uncontested in the skies. It seems this relatively comfortable setting has led commanders to conflate and confuse the concept of “airpower” with “air superiority.”
At this year’s Air, Space, and Cyber Conference, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall stated, “we are not walking away from the core United States Air Force (USAF) function of providing air superiority.” Statements like this are common from Air Force officials who, for an entire generation, have become accustomed to flying uncontested in the sky.
But “airpower” and “air superiority” are not the same. In order to get clear on their proper definitions, analysts must realize the disparate difference between combat airpower in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and in a great power conflict (GPC). If the USAF carelessly imports poor definitions from GWOT into GPC, the results could be disastrous.
For example, let’s look at the display of combat airpower during Operation Inherent Resolve. Targets were struck successfully with no combat airpower losses due to the enemy. The United States could reasonably expect all aircraft would return to base after a mission, ready to re-engage the next day. Contrast this with American losses at the Battle of Midway: over 230 planes deployed with around 150 lost. If commanders aim for GWOT levels of “air superiority,” then they risk incurring significant casualties among aircrew and the destruction of irreplaceable platforms
In short, the USAF needs to adjust expectations back to what the USAF can deliver through the air. The best way to adjust expectations is to return to Air Force doctrine and adequately apply it to great power conflict.
When commanders were facing terrorist organizations and strongholds in the Middle East, they asked how the USAF could eliminate the enemy. Aircrew and commanders never had to check their tail for an ISIS or Al-Qaeda fighter. As the USAF became acclimated to having complete control of the skies – air supremacy – the discussion began to shift from degrees of airpower support, to constant, pervasive, and unchanging “air superiority.” As a result, how many people speak colloquially about the aims of the Air Force is at odds with Air Force doctrine.
Back to the Doctrine
Secretary Kendall’s comments above reinforce the recent assumption that establishing air superiority is the chief function of the USAF. In making “air superiority” the chief aim, Secretary Kendall seems to be taking cues from the Future Operating Concept (FOC).
In practice, however, both Secretary Kendall and the FOC fail to provide a clear definition of what air superiority includes. Is it flying uncontested? And if so, how would the USAF achieve this with a peer adversary? The USAF needs to return to a more basic, accurate metric for what the USAF’s core function. This means a return to the concept of airpower.
Fortunately, the USAF will not need to invent a new doctrine whole cloth. It simply needs to return to Air Force Doctrine Publication 1 (AFDP-1), the 2021 Air Force capstone doctrine document that forms the basis of the service’s culture. The Air Force never mentions air superiority, but rather focuses on airpower as the chief metric by which USAF supports the National Defense Strategy and upon which success should be measured. According to AFDP-1, “[airpower is] the ability to project military power through control and exploitation in, from and through the air.” In short, airpower comes in degrees and can be thought of as a continuum of lesser to greater control in the air.
To find a definition of “air superiority,” the USAF must turn to Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-01 “Counterair Operations,” the 2023 doctrinal document outlining how the US Air Force can control the sky. Air superiority is “the control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats.” This last component is crucial and suggests a wide gap between GWOT and GPC air expectations.
If airpower is a continuum of control of the air, then air superiority is the area on said continuum wherein the USAF can fly without prohibitive interference. We can loosely graph the airpower/air superiority relationship in the following manner.
Obviously, the risks of mechanical failure always exist even in air supremacy situations, but the goal of the above figure is not mathematical precision. Instead, this graph indicates that as the level of airpower increases, the relative level of combat risk decreases. This relationship holds loosely across three zones: air inferiority, parity, and superiority. Ultimately, the core function of the USAF is to steadily increase airpower in a given time or place until a specific mission is achieved.
Indeed, some missions in the Pacific might be achieved without total air superiority.
The Army Air Corps generals who fought in the Pacific knew this, which is why their language does not match current usage. General George C. Kenney, commander of Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific area understood the difference between airpower and air superiority. The exercise of airpower was a gradual process by which USAF cut off supplies and isolated Japanese garrisons on one island after another. Because of the geography of the Pacific theater, this was a slow campaign, where victories were regional. It makes little sense to speak of “air superiority in the Pacific theater” until summer 1944 when the Japanese Army Air Forces and defenses were exhausted. And note that even when the US obtained air superiority in the Pacific, this alone was not sufficient to secure Japan’s surrender.
While many of the USAF’s capabilities have changed – the service can now refuel in the air, extending its reach deeper into enemy airspace – the geography of the Pacific has remained the same. The United States’ goal will be not just to hop from island to island, but to web islands together in a hub-and-spoke like fashion in order to prevent the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from cutting off US forces as General Kenney cut off Japanese forces. Airpower will be hard won, local, and perpetually in flux due to PRC space and missile capabilities.
Aware of the lessons from World War II, AFDP-1 cautions readers that “air superiority may not be achievable in all places or at all times.” It does not follow from this concession that the USAF has no mission to fulfill in a GPC, despite the colloquial way in which air superiority is discussed today.
The way forward
As the US Air Force doubles down on great power competition strategies, clarifying concepts of airpower and air superiority will be essential for setting obtainable goals. Unattainable goals will not only mislead American public expectations, but it will needlessly risk the lives of airmen and women. A number of benefits are obtained by cleaning up how we speak about air superiority.
First, by recognizing that the chief goal of the USAF is to provide the airpower necessary for taking a mission objective, the Air Force can better align its force structure and training programs, ensuring that airmen are properly prepared. This will include identifying the critical technologies needed to stay ahead of peer adversaries. Second, the Air Force can follow through on its pledge to define and refine its force design geared toward great power competition. By establishing a more precise and workable definition of airpower, the Air Force can enhance its communication with the joint force. Providing effective mass for combatant commanders must be the way forward.
The Air Force must abandon the careless, colloquial definition of air superiority that emerged during the GWOT and return to the proper discussion of airpower as a continuum. This continuum will need more specification regarding the degree of control, risk assessment, and other relevant variables. In the meantime, we should stop mindlessly repeating the mantra that the USAF’s purpose as always and everywhere providing air superiority and get back to the basics of airpower.
Major Joseph “Paveway” Bledsoe III, USAF, is an F-15E Instructor Pilot and Fellow at the Institute for Future Conflict, US Air Force Academy, CO.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Defense Department, or the US government.