This past year the Institute for Future Conflict partnered with the Front Range Consortium (FRC) to publish articles from their National Security Scholars Program (NSSP). This program was open to students at Colorado College, Colorado State University, CU Boulder, Denver University, the United States Air Force Academy, and University of Colorado-Colorado Springs.
We will be publishing several articles over the course of the month showcasing the results of the NSSP's research.
China’s Xi Jinping has abandoned the old Chinese political slogan of “Hide your strength, bide your time,” which formerly characterized the PRC’s foreign policy. China is now openly asserting itself on the world stage, and the Middle East is where this shift is most visible. Here, at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, China is grabbing strategic footholds and seeking influence, gaining leverage over global energy, trade routes, and competition. While China’s power in the region is still outpaced by the United States, its long-term investments and partnerships are steadily reshaping the region. The United States can’t afford to make a mistake here. In the era of great power competition, the Middle East is too important to neglect.
This essay will explore China’s motivations for investment in the Middle East, explain how China is accomplishing its goals, and recommend the United States target key areas to slow China’s influence in the region.
China’s Motives for the Middle East
Why is China increasingly interested in the region? One explanation is the classic geoeconomics we’ve seen time and time again from Beijing: China’s material interests drive its engagement. China wants oil, ports, and infrastructure. Five of China’s top 10 oil suppliers are located in the region, and over 50 percent of China’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow strait connecting the Persian Gulf to the open ocean, acting as the world’s most important oil chokepoint. With the war in Iran now underway, the Strait’s vulnerability has only grown. Houthi activity, regional strikes, and mines have skyrocketed the risk of shipping transport, making Hormuz not just a Chinese concern but a global flashpoint. For Beijing, securing this corridor is essential.
China's motives are clear: to keep the oil flowing and remain an indispensable economic partner to countries across regional divides. Even amid the conflict, China has continued to profit from the Middle East’s fault line by opportunistically building a network of relationships that gives Beijing options. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to secure big-ticket contracts and move towards North African markets. China is major trading partner with Gulf states who see Iran as a direct threat to security and order. China also continues to exercise significant economic ties with Israel.
Another critical motivation for China is maintaining domestic stability. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) internal priorities—regime security, economic growth, and political stability—shape its foreign policy decisions. The push for Chinese companies to expand overseas to strengthen its global influence, and its emphasis on national rejuvenation, drive Beijing to secure resources and markets. After all, engagement abroad supports performance legitimacy at home. The Middle East is a region with underdeveloped resources and often looking for outside development. Thus they find China on its doorstep.
China’s Means for the Middle East
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global infrastructure development strategy, has become the chief tool for its Middle East engagement. Economic deals between Chinese SOEs and regional partners are popping up everywhere. Partnerships in tech and EVs, mineral mining, oil and gas, and renewable energy tie Middle Eastern infrastructure to Chinese markets, transforming trade routes. Notably, the COSCO Shipping Port terminal in Abu Dhabi, which gained attention in 2021 over dual-use suspicions, serves as a key BRI trade hub in the UAE, a key US partner.
However, China’s Middle East playbook isn’t one-size-fits-all. In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), you’ll find modern ports and energy deals stamped “Made in China.” Egypt and Iraq cherry-pick Chinese trade, tech, and oil deals. Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria get the occasional handshake, but grand promises rarely materialize.
Of course, Chinese money is never free. Investments often come with expectations and unspoken obligations that extend well beyond financial returns. Recipient countries find themselves under subtle or overt pressure to align with Chinese positions in international forums, support Beijing’s policy preferences, or avoid criticism of China’s domestic affairs. These economic ties double as a political leash.
Take, for example, the CCP’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims. In theory, the party's well-documented widespread repression and persecution of Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang province should spark condemnation across the Muslim world. Yet, what do we hear from most Middle Eastern states? Silence. That’s not an accident. When your country’s next highway, port, or power plant depends on Chinese loans and Memorandum of Understandings (MoU), voicing objections comes with risks.
Two Dependencies
China’s economic success in the Middle East is largely dependent on two things: diplomatic neutrality and free riding under the US security umbrella.
The Middle East is unpredictable and complex; alliances shift quickly, and rivalries are deeply rooted. China recognizes that publicly aligning with one side could jeopardize opportunities with others, especially when today’s rival could be tomorrow’s business partner. Maintaining neutrality allows China to keep its options open for deals and to present itself as a pragmatic and stable alternative to the interventionist policies associated with the West.
While China’s engagement often increases when United States involvement decreases, Beijing usually stops short of displacing American leadership entirely. While Washington has historically invested heavily in regional defense, China has largely benefited from the US security presence, expanding economic and diplomatic ties without assuming comparable military costs or rocking the boat with regional partners.
These dependencies were evident in China’s role in brokering the 2023 peace deal between rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. Acting as a mediator between these two major oil exporters secured steady energy supplies and boosted China’s influence in the Middle East. This event also allowed Beijing present itself as a responsible global power. Perhaps most importantly, the move allowed China to bypass the United States and strengthen its position as a key regional player without taking on security commitments.
China has not veered away from this model amid the current war in Iran. Beijing seeks to safeguard its interests, but not at the cost of direct entanglement. China doesn’t want the war to spread. Middle Eastern oil keeps the lights on in Beijing. For the past decade, China’s been Iran’s top trade partner, and Beijing prizes stability and reliable trade routes. Yet, China is unwilling to give up its deliberate neutrality, offering only vague rhetoric and limited follow-through towards Iran, proving that the disproportionate relationship stops short of tangible commitments. Conversely, China’s ability to rely on US security guarantees is already eroding, as US involvement in the current war and its wider regional externalities limit China’s economic opportunities, exposing the limits of the PRC’s model.
Slowing China’s Influence
China’s footprint in the Middle East is growing too large to ignore. For decades, the United States exchanged security guarantees for regional influence. China now offers an alternative: economic investment and diplomatic engagement without demands for regime change or reform. In response, Middle Eastern states hedge between the United States and China, benefiting from US security ties while taking Chinese capital. This breaks Washington’s monopoly on influence without triggering direct confrontation. China has not yet displaced the United States in the Middle East with its calculated moves. It sustains its Middle Eastern relationships through rhetoric, symbolic special envoys, and ever-increasing economic statecraft. But it is reshaping the region’s political economy by playing the long game, slowly tilting the region’s balance of power and eroding US presence.
Status quo is not an option for the United States. If the United States wants to remain a relevant power in the Middle East, first it must rethink its approach and adapt to counter China’s strategy. This begins by understanding the PRC’s motivations in the region. Furthermore, China benefits when the United States is seen as unreliable or distracted. To counter this, the United States needs sustained engagement: showing up consistently in the Middle East with diplomatic and economic solutions, not just military power. China is seen as a diplomatic player, yet its actual accomplishments make a short list. If the United States will renew its engagement, it can present itself as a credible alternative to China’s empty words. The United States must offer follow-through and economic impact.
Second, the United States should increase scrutiny of Chinese activity in the region, especially in ports, telecommunications, cloud infrastructure, and technology ecosystems and alert partners when these systems are compromised.
Third, the United States should reaffirm and follow through on clear red lines. If a partner deepens ties with Chinese firms in sensitive sectors, Washington should be prepared to respond accordingly.
When it comes to future competition between the United States and China, the Middle East is a corner of the world that cannot be ignored.
Danielle Schmitz is a National Security Scholar with the Front Range Consortium, currently working with USCENTCOM, monitoring Chinese activities in the Levant region.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, Defense Department, or the US government.