This past year the Institute for Future Conflict partnered with the Front Range Consortium (FRC) to publish articles from their National Security Scholars Program (NSSP). This program was open to students at Colorado College, Colorado State University, CU Boulder, Denver University, the United States Air Force Academy, and University of Colorado-Colorado Springs.
We will be publishing several articles over the course of the month showcasing the results of the NSSP's research.
In stories where people think about the use of nuclear weapons being used, it is usually a major nuclear power who starts the exchange, with a country like the United States, Russia, or China responding in kind. Americans tend not to think about Pakistan, but they should.
Pakistan is currently pushing the bounds of low yield weapons, revealing an alternative narrative wherein the crossing of the nuclear threshold might occur at a lower level. Though Pakistan doesn’t seek intercontinental ballistic missiles to threaten the United States, an attack on India would have dramatic international consequences that require the United States’ involvement. A post-detonation situation remains inherently unpredictable.
In this article, I will show that Pakistan’s integration of tactical nuclear weapons into their doctrine undermines stability in South Asia by lowering the nuclear threshold, increasing command-and-control risks, and incentivizing rapid escalation during limited conventional conflict. I will run through a brief history of India-Pakistan relations in extended conflict. Then I will discuss the Indian causes that are leading to Pakistan’s misapprehension that low yield nuclear weapons will solve their problems. In reality, they are likely to make the Kashmir situation far worse.
Overview of the Historical Environment
In April 2004, India’s Cold Start Doctrine was introduced, which emphasized rapid mobilization for limited conventional incursions into Pakistani territory. To counter this aggression and offset its conventional military disadvantage, Pakistan has developed low yield nuclear weapons. This follows a stability-instability paradox, wherein the presence of nuclear weapons decreases the chances of all-out war but increases lower-level conflicts and proxy wars. Since partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have contested sovereignty over Kashmir. Separatist violence and political unrest in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir have increased tensions for decades. Along with the historical battles with Pakistan, India believes that Pakistan is backing revolts in the region to gain influence and power. Additionally, the United States has been involved in mediating conflicts in the region, including a 2025 border dispute over Kashmir, which included nuclear signaling between the two countries. While the United States is used to mediating, increasing nuclear variables increases the miscalculation risks.
India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Escalation Dynamics
On July 18, 1947, the British Parliament passed the India Independence Act partitioned the Kashmir territory into parts given to Pakistan and India, with borders splitting towns and dividing ethnolinguistic groups. The British-drawn borders cut through regional and cultural backgrounds, resulting in occasional violence and upheaval. Since the partition, Pakistan and India have had many conflicts dating back to 1949.
When India tested their first nuclear weapon in May 1974, the border skirmishes between the two countries did not change much. India failed to deter an armed resistance in July 1989 that was backed by Pakistan. India’s nuclear weapons, rather than bestowing an untouchable status, incentivized Pakistan to proliferate. Again, when India conducted an underground nuclear test close to the Pakistani border in May 1998, Pakistan responded with six tests of their own. Violent border incursions continue to this day in Kashmir.
Nonetheless, India appears increasingly confident that their limited conventional operations can remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In a conflict on April 22, 2025, they targeted Pakistani air bases and air defense missiles deep within the country, only to render a ceasefire three days later. India assumes that if they only participate in limited conventional incursions into Pakistani territory, the conflict will not turn nuclear. Pushing these limits slowly allows for India to continually act aggressively but keep escalation low.
Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine
In December 2025, Pakistan passed the 27th constitutional amendment, which consolidated authority in the Chief of Defence Forces, moving away from a civilian controlled system to giving military full autonomy. For smaller scale, theatre nuclear weapons, this means increasing the credibility of nuclear first use. By prioritizing military control, the institutional constraints typically found in a state’s government are significantly reduced via centralization and immunity. The amendment gives the Chief a lifetime immunity from arrest and criminal prosecution and greater concentration of authority within the military chain of command risks exacerbating civil-military imbalances, particularly in deciding to first strike.
Additional regional risks are incurred with this amendment as launch authority is delegated down the chain. The very features that make theatre nuclear weapons attractive for increasing negotiating power also generate significant command and control risks. These features include lower yield payloads delivered by intermediate range missiles, which can be launched closer to the conflict to render smaller regional effects. But simply putting the weapons closer to conflict is not enough. Proper battlefield use of low yield nuclear weapons requires pre-delegation of launch authority and forward deployment of nuclear assets. The adversary must believe that you have the resolve to use the weapons. If launch authority is removed by multiple rungs in the chain of command, the adversary (i.e. India), must have great doubt about the timely use of these weapons. Resolve is made up of a combination of two things – the correct capabilities to carry out the intended effects and the command and control structure to allow for timely decisions; right now, Pakistan only has one.
On the policy and implementation side, Asim Munir, Pakistan’s current Chief of Defence Forces, is striving to increase the usability of nuclear weapons. Most nuclear states view their weapons as a desperate last resort. Rather than using them as a last resort, Munir has developed an aggressive posture where nuclear weapons can be deployed at any level of war. Now Pakistan’s doctrinal ambiguity increases the possibility that a conventional border crisis could escalate toward nuclear use under conditions of severe instability. Although the first use of nuclear weapons in this case would be low yield, India’s publicly declared doctrine suggests it could respond with large-scale retaliation, which would entail a regional disaster with international fallout.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s development of theater nuclear weapons addresses an immediate tactical vulnerability while simultaneously introducing a broader strategic dilemma. By crossing the nuclear use threshold at lower levels of conflict, total nuclear war becomes more likely. Apart from the United States and Russia, Pakistan is one of the few nuclear powers that has explicitly integrated short-range nuclear systems into an operational doctrine designed for battlefield use.
Historically, the United States has had a complicated relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan has hosted the US military during the Afghanistan War, held mediations with Iran, and the United States has played the role of deterrent and mediator during border skirmishes. This new nuclear calculus in South Asia demands international attention, especially since it could further complicate matters in the Indo-Pacific region.
In the end, Pakistan’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons is an attempt to restore deterrence credibility against India’s conventional superiority. Yet by making nuclear employment appear more usable, Pakistan’s systems undermine the very strategic stability they are intended to preserve. The resulting deterrence paradox raises broader questions about whether limited nuclear options can ever remain limited once introduced into active conflict.
C1C Lily Johnson is a senior at the US Air Force Academy, majoring in Astronautical Engineering and minoring in Nuclear Weapons and Strategy.