How a conflict ends sets the stage for the next conflict. In the previous articles in this series, I examined developing economic fortitude to deter conflict and weaponized interdependence during a conflict. The articles “The Dollars before the Fight” and “The Dollars in the Fight” discuss the what and the how of ensuring US security through economics. This article examines what happens to US allies and partners after a conflict. Specifically, it focuses on the importance of building economic resiliency to avoid future conflicts and instability. It benefits the US economy and national security to focus on post-conflict trade incentives to ensure long-term success beyond temporary cessation of violence.
What does recovery look like? In “Dollars before the Fight,” I defined fortitude as “the ability to withstand economic pressures during a conflict.” While fortitude is necessary for weathering a conflict, at the cessation of conflict, countries also need to be able to recover from these disruptive events without sowing the seeds of future conflict. There has been considerable academic literature on peacebuilding—ranging from critical theory to liberal peacebuilding to authoritarian conflict management—but a gap remains regarding practical applications in a world of technological and economic interdependency. The United States needs a strategic approach to understanding how countries might recover from fractured supply chains, maintain a technology-forward economy, and avoid dependence on adversaries. For example, Ukraine’s ability to continue to build its IT economy, even amidst conflict, provides guiding principles, while Iraq’s inability can teach the United States what to avoid.
So what can countries do after conflict? Popular scholarly literature looks to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) as crucial criteria for establishing peace in post-conflict states. This type of literature supports building a monopoly on violence and disincentivizing individual groups from continuing the violence. The literature focuses on avoiding the “conflict trap,” which is a cycle wherein a war wrecks a country’s economy, drags citizens into poverty, and then increases social division, which in turn increases the probability of future wars. In its 2026 Outlook, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that peace is frequently fragile, and a relapse into conflict can completely wipe out the initial peace dividend. History is full of case studies where the economic rebuild was critical to post-conflict peace, including famous moments like the success of the Marshall Plan or the failure of the Coalition Provisional Authority after the US invasion of Iraq.
What does that mean for future conflicts? Planning a viable economic peace is critical for success. This may seem paradoxical: how can a war-torn country prepare for a post-conflict world and ensure the financial viability of its populace? Ukraine is a great example of a liability becoming a strength. Prior to the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s main industries were agriculture, heavy industry, and a growing tech sector. Now, Ukraine has a thriving defense tech sector, and the IT sector remains the largest exporter of services in Ukraine. This digital shift provides a critical guiding principle for recovery: unlike heavy industry or agriculture, digital services are “kinetic-resistant.” Because they operate across borders and rely on decentralized infrastructure, they are far less susceptible to physical sabotage, providing a more resilient and stable model for post-conflict stabilization.
How can the United States apply this lesson? The United States benefits from its allies obtaining successful post-conflict stability while still ensuring that allies share the burden of peacekeeping. History has shown that the United States can benefit economically in such circumstances by developing beneficial trade relationships, encouraging favorable environments for US corporations, and ensuring key commodities do not go to would-be adversaries. Absent a concerted effort to secure an enduring economic peace, countries face the imminent danger of resource depletion and exploitation, a phenomenon illustrated by the ongoing instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-97 and 1998-2003, respectively). To this day, the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group smuggles rare earth minerals, such as cobalt, into Rwanda, effectively stripping the Democratic Republic of the Congo of its natural resources. In addition to the smugglers, China has established control over key rare earth mines through agreements like the 2007 Sino-Congolais des Mines, which gave Chinese companies mining rights in exchange for building infrastructure.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not the only example of US adversaries reaping economic benefits from a war-torn country. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Chinese and Russian multinational companies moved in to dominate Iraqi oil. Even though the Iraqi government owns all of Iraq’s oil fields, starting in 2009, the government began to offer Technical Service Contracts (TSCs). While these contracts allowed the Iraqi government to keep most of the oil profits, both Chinese and Russian companies were willing to accept razor-thin margins and the fee-per-barrel arrangement Iraq offered. Crucially, these firms treated TSCs as strategic footholds for long-term geopolitical influence rather than mere commercial investments. By locking in these contracts, they created an enduring security vulnerability for Iraq. Iraq was permanently tethered to the technical and operational standards of Russia and China for its primary revenue source.
By contrast, encouraging US trade and fostering favorable investment environments creates a “virtuous cycle” that acts as a defensive perimeter around partner economies. Classic examples are Japan and West Germany after World War II or even South Korea after the Korean War. In the case of Kuwait after the First Gulf War, the US Army Corps of Engineers assisted in its reconstruction efforts. US companies such as the Bechtel Group and Caterpillar played a pivotal role in Kuwait’s recovery. In the case of Iraq after the 2003 invasion, there was an opportunity for a coalition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to provide more favorable investments than China and Russia. Tethering post-war countries to a friendly economic bloc makes it significantly costlier and more complex for adversaries to interfere. When a partner's economic success is integrated with a transparent, rule-of-law-based system, it enhances collective security by raising the barrier for external subversion.
How can the US think about building post-conflict economies in a way that benefits its interests? There is currently no US government office that looks comprehensively at economic resiliency from a security perspective. Traditionally, these questions were put to offices of foreign assistance, though each post-war situation remains dynamic. Properly allocating dollars after the fight requires analysis of strategic industries, competition, and potential vulnerabilities, with an eye towards immunizing post-conflict states from adversarial foreign interference. Existing entities like the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) tend to focus on traditional development and loans. Today, they currently lack the specific mandate for the type of security-focused, adversarial-context economic analysis required to prevent long-term foreign interference. The focus is instead often on sector priorities (e.g., critical minerals) and immediate returns for the American taxpayer. Both are important but leave a gap in how the US can ensure its adversaries do not take advantage of post-war economies.
While the United States is applying economic analysis to the homeland and strategic industries abroad in the Department of War with its Office of Strategic Capital and Economic Defense Unit, there is no central institutional group responsible for thinking about post-conflict recovery from a strategic defense perspective. To stop the wars of tomorrow and defend the homeland long term, additional resources must be devoted to ensuring a roadmap for post-conflict economic resiliency outside of traditional foreign aid.
Emma Campbell-Mohn, Operations Analyst, Department of the Air Force Program Acquisition Executive Command, Control, Communications and Battle Management.
The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, the US Department of War, or the US government.