This past year the Institute for Future Conflict launched its first annual essay contest, open to undergraduate students at Colorado State University, CU Boulder, Denver University, the United States Air Force Academy, and University of Colorado-Colorado Springs.
The prompt asked students and cadets: Explain what – if any – actions the United States could have taken, beginning in July 2021, that would have successfully deterred Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We are proud to publish the last winner of this contest today.
Could the US Have Deterred Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?
By the summer of 2021, US intelligence agencies were warning that Russia was preparing for a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. These warnings grew over the following months and by early 2022, the signs were clear: Russian troops massing at Ukraine’s borders, military exercises used as cover, and increasingly aggressive rhetoric from the Kremlin. Despite clear indications of Russia’s intentions, the United States failed to deter Vladimir Putin from launching a war that would become the most violent conflict on European soil since World War II.
The United States did act by issuing stern diplomatic warnings and threatening sanctions. Once the war was underway, the United States gradually increased military assistance to Ukraine. All of these measures were too cautious, too late, and ultimately not credible enough to shift Putin’s calculus. He believed the invasion would be fast and decisive, that Kyiv would fall in days, and that the West would respond with indignation, not intervention.
To have had a real chance at stopping the invasion, the United States should have challenged those assumptions earlier. Three measures stand out: exposing the falsehoods behind Russia’s intelligence assessments of Ukraine; imposing serious sanctions before the invasion; and accelerating US military aid to Kyiv in a way that would have shown significant Western commitment.
Changing Putin’s Calculus
Much of Putin’s confidence rested on a mistaken belief that Ukrainians, especially in the east and south, would welcome Russian forces as liberators. That belief wasn’t just a hunch, it was based on flawed intelligence delivered by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), which had told the Kremlin that support for President Volodymyr Zelensky was weak and that Ukrainian forces would fold under pressure.
As extensive reporting from the Washington Post later confirmed, Russian intelligence significantly underestimated both the strength of Ukrainian national identity and the readiness of Ukraine’s armed forces. The United States and its allied intelligence agencies were aware of Russia’s internal assessments and knew how wrong they were. Ukrainian civil society had been mobilizing since 2014. Polling showed strong support for national independence and increasing distrust of Moscow. Even many Russian-speaking Ukrainians had come to view Russia as a threat rather than a brotherly protector.
The United States could have done more to challenge Russia’s assumptions. It could have declassified this intelligence and shared it as coordinated public campaigns in Kyiv, Moscow, and Europe. This would have directly undermined the narrative of Ukrainian weakness. Unlike the public warnings issued starting in November of 2021, which alerted the world but failed to compel decisive NATO action, an earlier, targeted information campaign would have been backed by verifiable intelligence and framed to influence specific Russian decision makers. By carefully timing the release of this intelligence and linking it to mobilization indicators, the US would have created credible doubt among Russian military elites and key business leaders about the feasibility of a rapid invasion. Even if Putin himself remained unconvinced, this hesitation would have bought Ukraine valuable preparation time, and the approach would have been more credible than the broad warnings issued later.
Tie Sanctions to Mobilization Milestones
The Biden administration made clear in late 2021 that if Russia invaded Ukraine, the US would respond with sweeping economic sanctions. That warning came true after the tanks crossed the border.
There was sufficient evidence of Russia’s intentions prior to the moment of invasion to impose sanctions. A more specific form of phased sanctions should have been tied to Russian mobilization milestones. For example, freezing assets as troops gathered near the border or limiting technology exports as exercises ramped up. A major read line could have been established by denying Russia’s access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). The US and its European partners eventually did this, but only after Russia invaded.
Would these early sanctions have triggered retaliation? Probably. Russia could have retaliated with cyberattacks and reduced energy exports to Europe. But these asymmetric actions were already happening, with or without early sanctions. More importantly, the risk of short-term retaliation should be weighed against the long-term catastrophe of full-scale war. If credible costs had been imposed early, targeting not only Russia’s financial system broadly but also the business elites whose wealth and influence depend on Putin, it is probable that Russia would have reassessed the risks of invasion. General economic restrictions do not significantly affect Putin, but sanctions directed at these key power holders could have generated internal pressure on him in a way that broad measures have failed to achieve.
Arming Ukraine Faster
Prior to Russia’s invasion in January of 2022, the US had begun supplying Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles, ammunition, and other equipment. But the aid was slow, incremental, and largely quiet, as Reuters later reported, significant shipments were metered out and delayed, with Ukrainian officials describing them as arriving “six, nine months later, when the war has already changed.” It didn’t send the message that the West was fully committed to Ukraine’s defense, nor did it seriously complicate Russia’s invasion plans. In fact, this silent supply may have reinforced the misperception that Ukraine would be left to fend for itself.
A stronger deterrent would have looked very different. The US could have front-loaded lethal aid months earlier, moving high-profile weapon systems like Javelins and Stingers in bulk, scaling up joint training programs, and involving NATO partners in overtly building Ukrainian defense capacity. In fact, NATO allies had already demonstrated a capacity and willingness to provide substantial support. Programs such as the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package show that Allied nations were prepared to enhance Ukraine’s defense capabilities before the full-scale invasion. Just as important as the aid itself would be advertising its size and scale. News footage of deliveries, and coverage of training exercises would have sent a clear signal to Russia that Ukraine would not be an easy target
The plausibility of this strategy was echoed by NATO leadership. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has argued publicly that deterrence failed in Ukraine because support came too late to change Russia’s risk assessment. The lesson, he notes, is the “importance of providing support to partners sooner than later, as it was important to support Ukraine.”
This assistance might not have made Ukraine invulnerable, but it could have made the high costs of invasion clearer and the outcome less secure. That degree of uncertainty might have been enough to deter or at least delay Russia’s invasion.
Credible Deterrence
Deterrence only works when it rests on credible threats, and credibility depends not just on what the US says it will do but on what it does. In this case, the gap between words and action left space for Putin to gamble, which he did. For example, in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the United States and its allies issued strong statements of opposition but took limited concrete action, signaling to Moscow that the costs of aggression would be manageable. This historical precedent shows the importance of aligning deterrent threats with credible measures.
Avoiding early confrontation with Russia did not avoid conflict, it only postponed it. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has already created the very crises that earlier threats were meant to prevent: massive civilian displacement, economic turmoil, and a war that shows no clear signs of ending.
At the end of the day, Putin’s decision was rooted in ambition and strategic paranoia. None of these three steps guarantee that he would have changed his mind. But deterrence isn’t mind control, it is about altering risk calculations. In the months leading up to February 2022, the United States missed key chances to do just that.
The US could have challenged Putin’s assumptions by publicly countering bad FSB intelligence; by imposing drastic mobilization-based sanctions; and publicly arming Ukraine quickly. The lesson from February 2022 is that deterrence must be swift and proactive, not reactive.
Alan He is a cadet third class at the United States Air Force Academy.