When Ukrainian units noticed significant degradation in their Starlink services in late 2023, the cause wasn’t Russian anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons—it was Russian soldiers using Starlink themselves. The third most powerful spacefaring nation in the world, with decades of preparation and billions invested to counter American space capabilities, resorted to the old adage: if you can’t beat them, join them.

Russia’s pragmatic surrender to Starlink’s dominance isn’t an anomaly, it’s a preview. As I detailed in earlier, four factors make proliferated low earth orbit (pLEO) constellations nearly impossible to counter with legacy ASAT technology: limited line of sight; overwhelming target numbers; on-orbit link redundancy; and Kessler Syndrome risks. These aren’t just technical obstacles, they represent a fundamental shift in whether space superiority is obtainable in modern warfare. The United States faces the same challenges countering adversary constellations that adversaries face countering American ones. All of us have entered an era of mutual vulnerability in space, where episodic denial of capabilities may be possible, but sustained space superiority is not.

 

The Ground Segment Advantage

What can be done about the oncoming shift towards pLEO constellations? The most obvious answer lies not in space, but on the ground. pLEO constellations require extensive ground infrastructure: gateway stations to route traffic; control centers to manage satellites; and launch facilities for replenishment. These represent concentrated, terrestrial targets that striking could cripple a constellation more effectively than jamming thousands of satellites in orbit.

However, strikes against ground infrastructure carry escalation risks that space-based attacks may not. Rendering a satellite ineffective through jamming or cyber means offers plausible deniability and measured escalation. Launching kinetic strikes against facilities in mainland China does not. This political calculus, combined with adversaries’ ability to harden and distribute ground infrastructure, means space-focused solutions remain necessary despite their technical difficulty. Three approaches show promise: countering mass with mass; monitoring other attack routes; and accepting that no solution will be perfect.

 

Countering Mass with Mass

 If an adversary can put into operation thousands of interconnected satellites, the United States needs the capability to simultaneously target large numbers of them. Using today’s entire inventory of satellite jammers would not come close to meeting this mark; there is a simple need for more equipment. The question becomes what direction acquisition efforts should take. I offer two suggestions: attritable assets and the capability to conduct one-to-many targeting.

The United States’ most relevant fight with a peer competitor in space would be against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The two primary flashpoints—Taiwan and the South China Sea—are both maritime-centric. As such, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels carry outsize importance for the PRC’s schemes of maneuver. LEO satellites beam data down in a tight, focused stream—like a laser pointer versus a flashlight. With ships at sea, however, having the jammer in the right position to affect that beam becomes next to impossible from the land. Instead, a US joint force would have to rely on air, sea, and space-based jammers, all of which would become obvious targets for the PLAN given how much energy jammers radiate. Therefore, asset attritability—cheap enough that loss is acceptable—becomes vital. This would allow the joint force to disrupt satellite operations for brief periods while accepting eventually these ASAT platforms will be destroyed or circumvented.

Additionally, deploying the quantities of ASATs needed to neutralize a pLEO constellation would prove to be a logistical nightmare if they target one-to-one. Future ASATs must maintain the capability to simultaneously target multiple satellites from a single weapon system. This would cut down on the amount of equipment needed to counter pLEO constellations, yielding both a logistical boon and providing redundancy against the PRC.

 

Prioritizing Different Attack Vectors

Embedded within pLEO’s advantages are some disadvantages. For one, satellites passing overhead so rapidly means receivers must create constant new links. Each new link represents a potential inroad into the system through electronic means. Additionally, most pLEO satellites require significant network hardware and software to maintain connectivity in their constellation. This provides more targets for cyber operators than traditional geostationary (GEO) satellites. As the US Space Force looks to stand up offensive cyber capabilities, it can hyperfocus its small cadre of offensive cyber personnel on vulnerabilities unique to pLEO assets.

A second pLEO disadvantage stems from mass production requirements. Building thousands of satellites quickly demands standardization and scale. Standardization and scale require uniformity—and uniformity creates vulnerability. SpaceX manufactures 55 satellites weekly using assembly-line processes; adversaries pursuing similar constellation sizes must adopt similar approaches. Each standardized component, software package, or manufacturing process represents a potential attack point. Supply chain attacks—whether introducing hardware flaws, compromising software, or degrading quality control—could affect hundreds or thousands of satellites simultaneously.

The challenge for attacking satellite manufacturing lies in access and timing. Modern supply chains span multiple nations and subcontractors, creating entry points for intelligence operations. Even domestically focused programs must source specialized components from limited global suppliers. The goal isn’t to compromise every satellite in orbit but rather introducing subtle flaws that degrade performance or create vulnerabilities across a significant portion of the constellation. If even 10-15% of a constellation launches with compromised systems, the cumulative effect on network reliability could prove substantial.

A third disadvantage is that pLEO satellites orbit far lower than those in GEO and medium earth orbit (MEO) creating opportunities for directed energy weapons (DEW). DEWs—lasers and high-powered microwave weapons capable of blinding or burning satellite electronics—have a much easier time hitting a target a few hundred miles up than one tens of thousands of miles away. However, ground-based lasers face another challenge: our atmosphere is chaotic, meaning the beam wobbles, scatters, and weakens as it goes, partly explaining why these weapons have proven difficult to develop.

The solution lies in platform placement. Airborne or space-based directed energy weapons avoid most or all atmospheric interference while capitalizing on low earth orbit’s (LEO) shorter engagement ranges. High-altitude platforms—whether aircraft, balloons, or satellites in slightly higher orbits—could engage pLEO targets during orbital passes with far greater effectiveness than ground systems. The good news is that the US Air Force’s airborne laser legacy programs suggest the technical foundation exists. What is needed next is a commitment to weaponizing these platforms specifically for counter-pLEO missions.

For ground-based systems, orbital mechanics offer a different advantage. PRC LEO satellites must circle the globe, crossing over nations friendly to the United States. Assuming those nations permitted it, the United States could create a network of ground-based directed energy weapons in locations beyond PRC’s power projection capabilities. Combined with airborne and space-based systems, this multi-layered approach could threaten the PRC’s pLEO constellations throughout their orbital paths. This could also become a soft power operation if the United States offered to subsidize small modular reactors to power these systems in isolated areas.

Unfortunately, the hardest obstacle isn’t in orbit—it’s in the Pentagon. These technical solutions face a bureaucratic obstacle: the United States can build the weapons but can’t decide who fires them. The prerogative for cyber-attacks against space systems falls somewhere between Space Command, Cyber Command, and intelligence agencies. Attritable jammers and DEWs could belong to any service depending on the platform. Operational control also gets contentious if targets span across different combatant command areas of responsibility. Until the Department of Defense resolves these seams—designating clear lead agencies, resourcing authorities, and operational concepts—even viable technical solutions will languish in the valley of indecision.

 

Accepting Imperfect Solutions

Barring any seismic shifts in technology, the United States has entered a world in which no one power can maintain sustained space superiority. While the potential for episodic superiority exists, every strategy I have recommended above can be turned against the United States. As space faring powers and private companies lean into pLEO constellations, the challenge will only grow.

The US joint force needs to reckon with this reality and adjust its operations. How will the Navy change its operations if it knows targeting data on its ships will almost certainly get relayed to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missile battalions on mainland China? Will the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment dispersal tactics be enough if PLA overhead imagery charts real-time aircraft locations across the Indo-Pacific? There are no planners on active duty today who have experienced a world in which the United States is challenged for space superiority, and it is better to experiment now before a crisis emerges.

However, the solutions offered here require years to develop and field while adversary pLEO constellations are launching now. China’s Guowang could deploy 13,000 satellites by 2030—a timeline that may outpace American acquisition processes. The window for establishing effective counterspace capabilities may be narrower than development timelines allow, demanding acceptance of capability gaps and interim risk during the transition.

The considerations outlined here—countering mass with mass, prioritizing different attack vectors, and accepting that no solution will be perfect—represent starting points, not silver bullets. Each carries risks and limitations. But the alternative of clinging to legacy approaches designed for a space environment that no longer exists guarantees failure. Ukraine’s bandwidth problem is America’s wake-up call. The United States can adapt now or adapt under fire—only one leaves us ready.

 

Major R. Jake Alleman is an Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Fellow at the Institute for Future Conflict at the US Air Force Academy.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Space Force, Defense Department, or the US government.